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Nationalism's Ethnic and Civic Models: Exclusionary/Inclusionary Dynamics from Weimar Republic till Post-reunified Germany

Dr. Abhay Kumar Mishra

Department of German Studies, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi M: (0)

9651713430 E: abhaymishra1968@yahoo.de Postal Address: C/O Dr. Premlata

Chandra Department of Foreign Languages, Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla
171005

Abstract: If the notion of 'pride' has to be reassessed, it cannot be decoupled from its manifestations. Germany, in recent time, has encountered the dialectics of ethnic, right-wing assertions on the one side and the rebuttal of this exclusionary model of national awareness by the integrative, inclusionary approaches on the other side. While discussing the tension existing between these two articulations, one is tempted to study German history from the time of the Weimar Republic of 1919 onwards. In its commitment to the constitution, this republic upheld the vision of an inclusionary civic nation, abhorring the malice of discriminations and promoting the freedom and equality of the citizens. Nazi regime overturned this model and under the programmatic coverage of its idea of 'nationalism' relating it to the 'Volk' embarked on the politics of exclusion based on race and beliefs. Why Weimar remained a definitive model for civic nationhood became exemplified when in the post-Nazi; i.e. post-World War II period, the Basic Law of Germany was returning to the Weimar republic's constitutional model of defining the nationhood in terms of civic citizenship and inclusionary striving. Inclusionary model of nationhood is undergoing a phase of test in the management of the immigration- pressure in Germany. As the proponents of the idea of 'Constitutional-Patriotism' would argue, there exists enough optimism today concerning the enlargement of the space of 'we' and increasing index of the possibility of attaching to the constitution based on democratic value in order to arrive at integrative order.

Key-words: Ethnic assertions, Weimar Republic, Nazism, Basic Law, Constitutional-Patriotism, Immigration

Germany, like any other European nation, presents its own mark in the upswing of the post-national phenomenon. Jürgen Habermas, the distinguished German thinker and social-scientist identifies in the case of Germany a sense of guilt. This sense of guilt refers to the holocaust experience in Germany, to the guilt attached to the Nazi past in the years immediately succeeding the end of World War II and continuing persistently thereafter. Tonia Fonderman refers to Jürgen Habermas' position on the post-national drive of the German state: "Jürgen Habermas identifies post-nationality not as a solely German characteristic but still as something that developed faster in Germany than in other nations. He, too, refers to post-nationality back to the traumatic experience with the Nazi-regime in World War II and to following loss of authority." (Fonderman, 2006,5). Another contemporary European thinker Rüdiger Buber follows same line of

argument and Tonia Fondermann writes: “Rüdiger Buber argues in a similar fashion when he speaks of Europe as being the “substitute love” of the Germans. Their post-national attitude, he relates to the ineffaceable guilt, which is still an active force today.” (Fonderman, 2006, 5).

It does yet not suffice to argue in the case of contemporary German exclusively in terms of the post-national identity. Some have counter argued against post-nationalism and maintained their stance supporting the claim that the idea of nation-state has yet not withered away and nation-states as such yet constitute the recognizable element at the global and European scale. To cite the argument put forward by Richard Allen: “Contrary to the arguments put forward above by the post-nationalists, the national state and its citizenship do still remain of key importance to the lives of many people in the world and therefore to political analysis too. There are many flaws with the belief that global politics has transitioned into a post-national arena. One of the most forceful arguments against post-nationalist analysis comes from Randall Hansen (2009), who accurately points out that the European Union is not an example of post-nationalism: rather than usurping their role EU is actually the product of European national states, such as Germany, co-operating on certain economic and political issues, and that these states remain able to opt out of provisions of EU treaties.”(Allen, 2010,5).

Pride and its contemporaneous denotation

In this context, the debate on the issue of the identity in terms of nation requires to be adequately addressed. This paper starts with this point of departure and it is an attempt to assess the validity of contesting and congruent notions of nationality, nationhood, national pride, and national ‘being’. The issue of national ‘pride’ occupies a definitive place in the repertoire of this discussion. It is apposite to start from the assertion of national ‘pride’ and then turn to the introspective history concerning the sensibility of nation in the case of Germany. In a news column in **The Guardian** on Saturday, March 25, 2001, titled *Germans split on right to be proud*, it was reported: “What began as a squabble has polarised into a national debate...mainstream conservative opposition has increasingly adopted the mantra of the extreme Right-Ich bin stolz ein Deutscher zu sein (I’m proud to be German).” (Germans split on right to be proud, Para 3).The German tabloid **Der Spiegel** on May 15, 2009 was voicing the same reality. Under the title “National Identity: Where Germans dare” it reported about the findings of the questionnaire among the German people on the issue of ‘pride’: “The main findings of the study, in which some 2,000 German citizens age 14 and upwards filled out a questionnaire of unprecedented thoroughness and nuance, are rather surprising. Nearly 60% of those surveyed shared the sentiment “I’m proud to be German.”

This dominant feeling of being ‘proud’ to be German stimulates its analysis in terms of belongingness, for it is belongingness, which underpins the consciousness of ‘pride’ and its expression. A straightforward, unambiguous notion of affiliation

evoked by the term of 'pride' remains doubtful. One of the arguable standpoints may relate the idea of 'pride' to the possessiveness of one's own traditions and customs. It may reflect the sensitivity of one's identity in terms of a concrete point of reference viz. language. Or, the ancestral 'soil' may support and corroborate the 'pride'. Viewed in these perspectives, the sense of 'pride' invariably implicates the undercurrent of being 'unique'. Understood implicitly in its allusion to the exemplification of the 'self' in its being 'unique', the notion of 'pride' has come to necessitate a sharp discussion on its 'inclusive/ exclusive' paradigmatic denotation. This paradigmatic discussion has increasingly elicited the intellectual endeavours to demarcate the 'foreignness' from the 'German-ness', the 'ethnic' from the 'civic' versions of patriotism in the domain of the consciousness built-up of the contemporary German debate on the propagative ideas like nationality, national sentiment, or also 'being' German. Concrete backdrop of this debate is constituted by the events occurring intermittently in the different corners of Germany.

Right Wing's articulations

In 1992, Neo-Nazi tendency became manifest in public at some places in Germany. The ideology of Anti-Semitism resurfaced. What appeared to be an instance of aggressiveness, the idea of belongingness, transformed itself into, as Jürgen Fijalkowski argues, 'xenophobic attitude'. He articulates about the situation of assertive rightists' forces and says in relation to the years 1992 and 1993: "Country was shaken by an unexpected and extensive wave of violence directed at foreigners-particularly asylum seekers-and minorities, accompanied by an increasing number of anti-Semitic incidents, such as the desecration of Jewish cemeteries and the use of Nazi symbols in graffiti." (Fijalkowski, 1993, 5). At the same time, the love for land came to expression in a form which ran counter to the aggressiveness of being national. Jürgen Fijalkowski adds to his articulation: "However, in many German towns and cities, a determined citizenry staged mass grassroots demonstrations against xenophobia, hatred, and violence in an effort to contain the attempts to undermine the democratic and human rights traditions." (Fijalkowski, 1993, 5). If nationalism or sense of being national relates to the self-differentiating awareness, the difference between two kinds of being 'national' seems to be evident. One, that relates to assert the self-differentiating principle through even forceful propagation of the identity based on one's 'soil and descent', the other through articulating one's national identity or pride by vouching for the civic principles of democracy, humanity and law of the country. The debate of inclusive nationalism vs. exclusive nationalism, ethnic nationalism vs. civic nationalism in contemporary Germany is grounded on this obtaining polarity.

Ethnic dynamics, homogeneity, and segregation of 'We' from 'They'

The formation of identity on the ground of ethnic bond remains to be seen not as an aberration of the consciousness of being national. The problematic adhering to the ethnic identity assumes significance when it espouses the thrust on exclusivity. It is in

this reference that this paper seeks to discuss the paradigmatic difference between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Pohl'ad Za Hranice says: "Ethnicity refers to a social bond based on the belonging to an ethnic group which defines itself or is defined by others as sharing common descent and culture." (Hranice, 2009, 864). In the discourse on nationalism, several strands have been identified and assessed. One among them refers to the formation and existence of the primordial concept of nationalism. In this version of national identity, the distinguishing interplay of the factors such as bonds of blood, race, language, region, religion, and customs fosters the awareness of the national sentiment among people. Alluding to this primordial bond, characterizing the ethnicity, Christophe Jaffrelot invoked Clifford Geertz: "The first studies of the political dimensions of ethnicity adopted an approach known as 'primordialism'. Edward Shils was the first to outline this theoretical position (Shils, 1957), finally formalized by Clifford Geertz (Geertz, 1963). Geertz's study arose from the contradiction between the features of a modern society (material progress, social reforms, civic culture etc.) and the resilience of what he calls the 'primordial bonds' (Geertz, 1963, p.109): bonds of blood, race, language, region, religion, custom." (Jaffrelot, 2003, 35). The idea of ethnic nationalism can be viewed in the perspective of the concepts of "jus sanguinis" and "jus soli". Both of them relate to the expression of the self in relation to a national consciousness. Ethnic nationalism refers to the first of them; i.e. "jus sanguinis" which denotes the bond based on the "Right to blood". Seen from this angle, ethnic nationalism is a consciousness, which thrives on the drawing the line of segregation of "we" from the "other" in its essentialist dimension. The accentuation of this segregation prepares the bedrock of pursuit of the program of the exclusion of the identified "other". About this segregation involved in the idea of ethnic nationalism, Christophe Jaffrelot, supporting his argument by reference to F. Barth, writes: "Barth suggests that what 'make ethnic distinctions *emerge* in an area' has much to do with the fact that each ethnic group can be 'associated with a separate range of value standards' (*ibid.*, p.18). The cultural content of this social unit may change, but its boundaries, as defined by these value standards, need to remain enforced in order to differentiate a 'we' from a 'they'." (Jaffrelot, 2003, 37). The identity-formation in the ethnic national consciousness begins and develops on the 'hiatus' created by the segregation. Plethora of efforts to take mileage out of this hiatus emerges and the scenario of sentiments and counter-sentiments even with reference to the ideology increasingly acquire their subsistence in the deficit of tolerance ensuing from the conflicting interests dominating the situation. This situation remains indicative of non-coherence and non-cohabitation with the 'other', whom an ethnical consciousness detests and resists on a number of grounds, viz., language, cultural traits, traditions and notion of purity expressed in terms of the distinction existing allegedly in 'blood'. The notion of the 'other', most often than not, enters into the ethnic national perception as the notion of the 'stranger'. To argue with Christophe Jaffrelot, who cites from J.A. Armstrong, ethnic "groups tend to define themselves not by reference to their own characteristics but by exclusion, that is, by comparison to "strangers"" (Jaffrelot, 2003, 37)." Richard Allen refers to Hans

Kohn's assessing the idea that the essential face of ethnic nationalism is expressed in the assertive principles of 'homogeneity' instead of 'heterogeneity', and in the idea of the 'uniqueness'. To quote Richard Allen in this context: "Ethnic and cultural nationalism are some of the oldest and most enduring forms of nationalism ideology. They are based upon the core idea that the nation is a primordial entity, antecedent of politic based on distinct and homogeneous ethno-cultural boundaries. Thus ethno-nationalism places great emphasis on the idea of the national community as an ethnically and culturally unique and homogeneous group that must be protected." (Allen, 2010, 6-7). This notion of the 'homogeneity' is retained precisely in the German word "Volk", which translates into "People".

Engaging the idea of Volk and distancing immigrants/minorities

The idea of "Volk" as being the substratum of the national identity had been refined by Herder in the 18th century Germany. "Volk" was related to and defined in terms of an "organic" totality. This organic tenor was grounded in the thesis of a hereditary language, common tradition, and the conception of the people as a "family". "Volk", as Herder worked it out, did not require unconditionally a 'state', for the 'family' served as the umbrella of belonging together in the awareness of existential realms of the individual with his domains of rights and duties. Recent decade in Germany has been witnessing the revival of the idea of "Volk", which derives support from the proponents of the right-wing thoughts espousing the exclusionary principle of national identity, and the politics of the segregation of the minorities. Richard Allen reminds: "Yet on 3rd October 1990 the two halves of the German nation reunified following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Many around the world, and especially in Europe, feared that there would be a resurgence of *völkisch* nationalism in Germany, leading to the chauvinism and exclusion that had often defined German nationalism in the past." (Allen, 2010, 2). Acceding though to the fact that the word "Volk" was extensively misused in the past by the Nazi ideology, what is imperative is to note and explain the currency which the right-wing thinkers are associating to the exclusionary principle of nation inherent to the practice of desecration and ostracizing of the minorities, which intrinsically reflects the nature of the associative content of Volk. Richard Allen points out: "Indeed, one prominent New Right thinker Pierre Krebs argued in the early 1990s that reunification was the chance for Germany to regain its traditional values and that it provided the perfect opportunity for Germany's 'cultural rebirth'. Historical sensitivities often preclude discussions of the German nation in racial terms, but the sentiment put forward by those such as Krebs arguably contains a belief in a German identity based on descent and common ancestry, as well as a distinct and superior German culture. This is clearly in accordance with the ethno-nationalist framework to maintain a state defined on homogeneous national identity in order to preserve a pure *Volksgemeinschaft* and provide a vehicle for national self-determination and assertion." (Allen, 2010, 9-10) This conception of national identity characterizes the move to pursue the politics of the exclusion of the immigrants too. In this context, Richard Allen continues with his substantiation: "As a result they saw

non-Germans as an external threat that would undermine the homogeneity, and thus the security of the German nation (Woods, 2007). Many New Right ideologues, such as Karlheinz Weißmann, called for an end to Germany accepting immigrants (1992), while others from the Thule Seminar believed that different races could not live peacefully together and advocated policies to induce non-German residents to leave Germany (Woods, 2007). Thus the New Right went further than just defining the German nation in benign ethnic terms and explicitly called for the exclusion of ethnic and cultural minority groups in order to promote German supremacy in the new Germany.” (Allen, 2010, 10).

Weimar republic, constitutional democratic values and civic national order

The overt expression of the ethno-national consciousness in numerous forms; for example, in eulogy of Nazi ideals, anti-Semitic violence, wrath against the immigrants has kindled a serious debate on the idea of nationalism from the perspective of the promotion of a national consciousness deriving its sustenance from the civic institutions based on the values of democracy and freedom as enshrined in the body of liberal political ideals of the West. In his essay on the strength of the liberal ideology behind 1848 revolution in Germany, Mathew Burke has written: “Liberals believed in constitutionalism, an overall goal of unification, civic equality, the rights of smaller states over rights by birth, and were opposed to absolutism.” (Burke, 2005, 137) Identifying the force of untrammelled perpetuation of the liberal ideals of democracy and civic equality, he added: “Although the liberals’ attempt at unification in 1848 ultimately failed, liberal ideals were not defeated” (Burke, 2005, 137). It is the resilience of this liberal tradition, which the strand of civic nationalism is trying to consolidate and disseminate in Germany. In so far as the idea of civic nationalism is rooted in the democratic constitutional order, the Weimar Republic existing from 1919 to 1931 occupies a determining instance in the discussion on the issue of civic nationalism. Weimar constitution ensured the equality of all Germans before the law, inviolability of the personal liberty, and free expression of ideas by word, in writing, in print, or in any other way. These constitutional guarantees provided the visionary foundation for the federal democratic republican order of Germany after the Second World War and these ideas of equality and freedom were enshrined in the basic law [*Grundgesetz*] after the Second World War in the Federal Republic of Germany. It has been generally cited that the disintegration of the Weimar Republic was caused by the factors like unemployment, yet in this republic only the “unemployment benefits” and absence of discrimination in providing the job was well in force. Michael A. Wilkinson has contended that the Weimar Republic was too ‘tolerant’ and it nourished the ‘over-valued ideas of liberal equality, misplaced in the political and social turmoil of the time.’ (Wilkinson, 2016, 5). This contention would be obscuring the very continuing significance of the ideal of ‘liberal equality’, for the same was enshrined in the basic law of Germany after the Second World War and that remains the ideal of paramount concern for the democratic tenets of contemporary Germany too.

However, Wilkinson's contention about the 'misplacement' of the liberal ideal in the political and social turmoil presents an instructive conceivable link between the Weimar Republic and the policy of protection against instability in the civic national constitutional order in post-war Germany. The historians have argued that one of the key factors of the final collapse of the Weimar Republic lay in the unpremeditated authoritarian turn in the republic, in that the absolute power vested in the president presaged unexpectedly the strengthening of the Nazi party in the elections of September 1930. The Republic suffered hence its final disaster emanating from the power of declaring the "state of emergency" by the President Hindenburg, its opposition, and subsequently yet the order by the President to call a new election in which the Nazi grabbed almost 100 seats.

Basic Law and civic national values

The conceivable link between the Weimar disaster and the formation of a civil democratic parliamentary system is reflected in the reference that the basic constitution, adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War, was a 'reactive constitution'. Peter Graf Kielmansegg argued: "There is general agreement that the Basic Law first and foremost is a reactive constitution. The past that had shaped the political outlook of the founding fathers and mothers had two faces: an ill-functioning, weak, and helpless democracy on the one hand and a cruel despotism on the other. Four fundamental conclusions were drawn from the memories: a constitution which effectively protected individual rights was to be the new sovereign; parliamentary democracy was to be institutionalized in such a way that strong and effective government was possible; democracy had to be enabled to defend itself against its enemies; and last but not least, the future Germany had to be definitely tied to the idea of peaceful cooperation among nations." (Kielmansegg, 1990, 6) In its being reactive to the tragic frailty of Weimar experience of constitutional democracy, the Basic Law which laid ground for the federal republic of Germany after the Second World War, did not deviate from the path of the Weimar Republic in ensuring civil rights to people, and in this respect the continuation of civic face of the democracy from Weimar Republic into the post-war Germany perpetuated. The core features of civic nationalism relate to common citizenship regardless of ethnicity, race, colour, religion, gender, language, a citizenry of equal rights, and sharing of political practises and values. Civic nation is 'democratic' in as much as it seeks to ensure attachment of the citizen to the civic institutions like parliament and the rule of law. Anna Stilz underlines that the "Civic nationhood is meant to describe a political identity built around shared citizenship in a liberal democratic state. It simply requires a disposition on the part of citizens to uphold their political institutions, and to accept the liberal principles on which they are based." (Stilz, 257). Basic Law converged on this idea of civic nationalism.

As this paper seeks to present civic nationalism as an inclusive venture, it is relevant to discuss as to how the adherents of the post-war model of civic nation based on the

features outlined above strove to sustain the inclusive nationalism of post-war Germany. The engagement of post-war Germany with the task of inclusionary nationalism inspired the leadership of the nation to address issue of exclusionary politics. It meant the endeavour to come to terms with the past (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*), in terms of rolling back any reappearance of the Nazi past, which was based on the exclusionary principle.

Nazism's exclusionary agenda

The new German state after the Second World War had to take into account that the Nazi ideology had perpetuated the politics of exclusion on several grounds, and more than that this exclusionary politics was sought to be justified in social, racial and political grounds. Nazi rule had pursued the politics of exclusion by targeting the minorities, principally political opponents, racial enemies, and social outcasts. Outlining the politics of exclusion by the Nazis, Nikolaus Wachsmann writes that those who threatened the 'body of the people' had to be ruthlessly excluded. This kind of exclusion was redolent of the perception that the cause of the disease to the 'body' of Germany was located in the 'Jews'. In order to regain the health of the people or the politics (body-politic), the disease; i.e. the Jews had to be exterminated. Fritz Klein, one doctor in the concentration camp, serving Hitler had identified in the Jew 'a gangrenous appendix', and had stated: "I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body." (Nationalism, Nazism-Genocide, para 29). The policy of singling out the target groups and consequently persecuting them represented the plan of the Nazi state to sanctify the German soil in the mirror of an ideology based on segregation pivoting on the extremity. Many have argued in this policy the agenda of the 'purism' orchestrated by the Nazi state. This 'purism' echoes the present-day repugnance against the minorities, as Richard Allen points out that "The representation of this extreme racial nationalism reached its unfortunate zenith in the ideology of the Nazis, consumed by hate for 'outsiders' that they viewed as being responsible for a conceived decline in German national culture and pride." (Allen, 2010, 7). Nikolaus Wachsmann has termed the Nazi policy of exclusion as the program to 'cleanse' Germany by adopting several distinct measures for the 'aliens', for example by sterilization, protective custody or establishment of the fringe 'colonies' for 'anti-social' families.

Post-War consciousness of no-war any more

Germany in its post-war year witnessed a serious concern for the acknowledgement of the violence against the Jews by Nazis. The past was taken as destruction, which had to be repaired. The exhortations were made that the war should never come again. It was cautiously realized that, to quote Robert G. Moeller, the 'past admonishes, not threatens'. Robert G. Moeller points out the re-construction of German consciousness, in that he notes that "Seen from the perspective of Weimar, the success of both German states at confronting the past of World War II-and moving beyond it-was remarkable." (Moeller, 167). Subscribing to the tenets of the Basic Law, the West

German state pursued the inclusionary policy in total distinction with the abominable extreme exclusionary principle of Nazism directed against Jews and political opponents. Robert G. Moeller has emphasized that the confrontation with the Nazism was the ground of the democratic culture of post-war Germany. He adds that for the newly emerged democratic German state, “History becomes important not as something to emulate, but as something to avoid repeating. The *difference* between past and present becomes the measure of progress.” (Moeller, 173). New German state, in its pursuit of inclusionary policy conferred on the Jews their liberty besides making reparations for their losses. Richard Buxbaum has pointed out that the “new German state obliged, as an element of regaining sovereignty to pass domestic legislation modelled on pre-sovereignty Allied Occupation legislation, compensating the racially and politically persecuted victims of Nazism, for both property loss and-for what at that time of course was the more straightforward and obvious issue-for the loss of life, liberty, and health.” (Buxbaum, 2004, 37). In other words, a new conception of nation, which was no more based on the *völkish*, racial nationalism of Nazism, was coming into being.

Contemporary immigration wave in Germany

Germany has come a long way since and at the time of re-union it was being recognized as one of the most vibrant nations in Europe. Within Germany, the Federal System has not only been engaged in the political re-structuring rather also social and economic rejuvenation. One of the key agendas at the economic forums pertained to the rejuvenation of the former East Germany and the social policies were also directed towards the dissemination of the liberal-democratic values in the erstwhile social system of the East German state. Presently, Germany retains a key voice in the decision-making parlance of the EU. Nonetheless, Germany is of late experiencing the unprecedented migration-wave within its borders. The statistics of the inflow of the immigrants show their number in hundreds of thousands. One of the major propelling sentiments on the side of the State in welcoming the immigrants related to the attempt to attenuate before the world the long-enduring guilt of the Nazi past of exclusionary nationhood. Lately, the number of immigrants started decreasing. The statistics showing the decrease in the number has been analysed and it remains a fact that many of those who came to Germany as immigrants did leave Germany within a considerably short span of time. The welcoming gesture to the immigrants in 2015 has lost ground in favour of the opponents of the open-door policy. The social pressure built up around the question of ‘security’ played a key role in the formation of the public opinion against the influx of the immigrants. To quote Krzysztof Garczewski: “German government...decided to accept and welcome hundreds of thousands of migrants in 2015 and 2016...Massive influx ...caused debates on their place in German society and the level of internal security.” (Garczewski, 2016, 127). Within a short period of time, the immigrants were leaving Germany though a sizeable number of them have stayed on in Germany.

Constitutional Patriotism and integrative model

Though the measures of integration remain an agenda of decision-making by the stakeholders of policies, what is equally important is to take into consideration any theoretical perspective which locates the issue of belongingness in its discursive framework. It is in this context that the discourse of ‘constitutional patriotism’ earns relevance. Though the idea of ‘constitutional patriotism’ was inaugurated by Dolf Sternberger in 1979, in recent years Jürgen Habermas has introduced this discourse for a broader spectrum of debate. What has prominently emerged from this debate is the proposition that belongingness to the state is a matter of rational allegiance to the Universalist values of democracy. In its trail, this program actualizes the contextual significance of ‘living together’. In so far as constitutional patriotism exhorts the task of perceiving each other mutually as equal and free citizens, citizen’s allegiance to the constitution is based on the ‘constitutional culture’, which entails the allegiance of the citizens to the law making which is oriented towards the conservation of the interests of all citizens irrespective of the claims of majority/ minority. Jan Werner Müller suggests: “Citizens are asked, then, to attach themselves to, and maintain, a system of rules for lawmaking that tracks their interests and that they would have no good reason to reject.” (Müller, 2008, 78). Constitutional patriotism promotes that idea of belongingness to the nation, which legitimizes moral principles relating to the sustenance of universal values which hold the citizens together. In as much as the underlying vision of constitutional patriotism refers to ‘living together’ by reconstitution of the idea of ‘we’, it allows for a room of openness towards, what Jan Werner Müller contends, “open future and the willingness of citizens to adjust the reasons, the object, and the mode of their attachment in light of new experiences.” (Müller, 2008, 85). It is this aspect of the inclination to attachment to the democratic values embodied in the constitution of the nation, which Habermas terms as “collective learning”. It elicits some affiliation to the model of ‘civic national’ identity, in that it sides with the ‘integrative outlook’. Elucidating the connection between Habermas’s theory of ‘Constitutional Patriotism’ and ‘civic identification’, Clarissa Rile Hayward notes: “A civic identity rooted in liberal and democratic constitutional principles, he suggests, can perform the integrative function.” (Hayward, 2007, 183) From the perspective of the immigrants, ‘being national’ reinforces the necessity of attachment to the values of the constitution, which rests on the democratic values. Claim on citizenship ordains recognition of the inherent strength inhabiting the core idea of freedom and equality. This model of the consciousness concedes to the adherence to a ‘social space’, in which mutual cognition of the citizens reinforces the assessment of the ‘own’ and the willingness to remain inclined to reconcile one’s own belief-systems and cultural etiquettes. On the other hand, the majority sharing the ‘social space’ with the minorities attests to its acceptance of harmonious ‘heterogeneity’ of norms and cultural rootedness. Being national in the awareness of conceding to ‘heterogeneity’ of socio-cultural belongings in a social space contrasts with the ideal of ‘homogeneous’ belongingness rooted in the sense of being ‘ethnically national’ with reference to Germany in recent times.

Conclusion: It is appropriate to underline that in the German history of the twentieth century two variants of the 'People' as the constituent of nation took shape. First among them referred to the Weimar Republic's liberal democratic model. This republic derived its legitimacy from a constitutional set up which guaranteed the rights of equality and democratic values ensuing from the state's jurisdiction. The constitution was a concrete embodiment of this democratic model. Following the end of the Weimar Republic in the face of internal and external instabilities, the Nazi regime ushered in. Nazi rule put into practice the rule based on a distinct notion of 'People' [Volk], which took its legitimacy from the pursuit of purism. Accordingly, the Jews, the political opponents and the minorities like Sinti and Roma became the target of the exclusionary politics of the Nazi. The constitution of the post-World War II Germany enshrined in its ambit the inclusive model based on the non-discriminatory equality and democratic rights. The time after the reunification is witness to the occurrence of the events which are redolent of the Nazi regime, as they veer around the practice of alienation, sometimes violent too, of the non-German immigrants and other minorities. The idea of 'constitutional patriotism' put forward by Jürgen Habermas and other thinkers prevails on the necessity to attest to a 'shared space' in which the minority and the majority, in so far as they come up with the willingness for the attachment to the constitution, could find a coherent existence based on the notion of mutual sustenance of interests.

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