



## Voters Mobilization Strategies: Challenges for Peace Building in Kogi State

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### Abstract

*Democracy without any strength of imagination is the most accepted form of government in the world today, because it is an open market where politics is played and driven by strategic mobilization. Consequently, democracy to a greater extent holds a strong appeal among the ordinary people with the aid of civil society and the media as the fourth estate of the realm. However, there is disconnection between the people, leaders and governance. This deliberate subterfuge and absurdity is occasioned by lack of holistic political behaviour on the one hand, and poor mobilization strategies of electorate. The paper therefore focuses on the imperative of mobilization that would make democratic participation and representation responsive, attentive, assertive and relevant as far as the issues of governance, development and post-election peace building without hiding under the ideological cover of religion and ethnicity or celebrated pork-barrel politics. The aim is to evaluate the synergy between vibrant political behaviour, democratic governance, and mobilization strategies. Some of our findings include; poor participation, qualitative representation and service delivery. We adopted the structural-functional approach. The conclusion is that, although the November 2015 governorship election in Kogi state was free, credible and fair, the re-run generated abnormal constitutional challenges and lack of mutual trust among the various ethnic groups. Part of our recommendations is that strategic mobilization would not only help transmit the principles, values and ideologies of democratic governance, but promote post-election peace building in Kogi state and Nigeria.*

**Keywords:** Political communication, Mobilization, Strategies, Development and Ideology.

### Background

Permit us to preface this discussion with an idle statement that neither ethnicity nor religiosity alone would promote good governance, development, eliminate the issues of poverty, insecurity, fragile economy and weak institutions. Finally, that Kogi is a state where the best and the worst will never happen either. Drawing heavily from the above, post electoral conflict and violence are real potential to our cooperate existence. Conflict therefore is an inherent feature of all societies, and it springs from two roots that cannot possibly be eliminated; these are, material scarcity and disagreement over values which are to be authoritatively allocated in any given society taking into consideration of who gets what, when, and how these values are evenly distributed. The reason is predicated on the simple assumption that the material resources are limited in quantity and different people and social groups often subscribe to so many and different values hiding usually under the ideological cover of ethnicity or religion. No doubt, this situation obfuscates the core values and principles of democratic participation and popular representation. However, since the modern State is a

welfare state, the hope of democracy usually is that the outcome of any political conflict or competition in whatever form will eventually create more winners rather than losers. Consequently, it is on rational scaffold such as this, that the challenges of voters mobilization and campaign strategies in Kogi state is imperative and is wheeled into an intellectual theatre for an invasive examination especially, as unprecedented and monumental concept of inconclusive election has deepened the existed apathy, rivalry and suspicion among the three major groups, (namely Ebira, Igala and Okun) in Kogi state. Our task as political scientist is simple and clear, and it resolves around providing explanation and suggesting practical solutions. What therefore are voter mobilization strategies?

The scholarly literature on voter mobilization and campaign strategies is ambivalent regarding the effects of closeness on turnout. Economic and political analyses of turnout (i.e. the classic calculus of voting) contend that as elections become closer, voters perceive their participation as more valuable because there is a greater chance that they will cast the deciding vote. Other work argues that voters do not take

closeness into account because the probability that their vote uniquely changes the outcome of an election is quite small even in close elections. Still, this second perspective maintains that closeness may increase turnout because elites distribute campaign resources to places where election results could be affected by mobilizing additional supporters. While the latter perspective is theoretically well-developed, empirical support for the notion that elite activity (rather than citizen perceptions) connects closeness and turnout is limited. Using improved measures of closeness and campaign activities, we forecast for citizen perception and voters mobilization strategies effects on turnout in the context of 2015 Kogi State Governorship Election. Results as announced the INEC show that while closeness has no direct effect on turnout, voters mobilization strategies indeed target campaign activities on close local government areas and the card readers rather than asymmetric distribution of resources across Kogi state results in higher turnout in battleground pulling units, thereby reducing the post election violence.

Mobilization, as defined by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), is “the process by which candidates, parties, activists and groups induce other people to participate”. In their analysis, voting is seen as a two-way street in that it is necessary to have strategic mobilization and individual motivation for participation to occur. We have consciously introduced two fundamental concepts (of participation and inducement), which we hope to explain, later. Using Rosenstone and Hansen’s framework, examples of direct mobilization include phone calls, facebook and other social media solicitations, and door-to-door canvassing, while indirect mobilization includes the identification and mobilization of leaders who, in turn, mobilize people in their individual networks, such as town meeting, music and dance of various groups on party basis. We must understand the nature of Kogi state and politics elsewhere in Africa as not totally different from that of

the developed nations except for few instances, which include but not limited to violent, intimidation, open confrontation, non-issue based campaigns, lobbying and other secret political activities such sharing of money and other gifts items to delegates, voters and followers. It must be stated clearly that this view has not been verified empirically.

Mobilization is a strategic choice made by candidates, campaigns, and groups that seek to include the largest number of people with the least amount of effort or resources. With targeted mobilization, heavy emphasis is put on identifying people who are centrally positioned within large social networks and individuals who are likely to respond to outreach efforts. However, the unfortunate aspect of the last Kogi state governorship election was the simple fact mobilization were not targeted on the real voters, probably because of lack of political behaviour, sophisticated political culture and socialization. For example, the major political parties did not focus their campaign on issues on radio, television or social network, rather, they resorted to baseless claims and sponsoring of thugs, without directly speaking to voters.

Using targeted mobilization in electoral politics means identifying enough votes to elect a candidate to office. It is not uncommon to see political parties, campaigns, and interest groups all implement identification and GOTV (Get out the Vote) programs. Modern day GOTV operations are equipped to turn out candidate and issue supporters based on the limited campaign resources available. First, the most likely voters are encouraged to vote. This is confirmed by us that strong partisans are about 5.3 % more likely to be contacted in a presidential election and that people mobilized by the All Progressive Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) were 7.8 % more likely to vote. The contextual situation of whether a person has been asked to participate must remain a factor in mobilization as other intrinsic and extrinsic

variables are reviewed. This view is supported by the outcome of voters during the last election, as compared to the presidential election of last year. It is important to state the obvious that, the re-run governorship election witnessed low turnout, thereby confirming the position of Rosenstone. In addition to being asked, it is important to look at who asks – the political party, the campaign, or the candidate. In his study of the relationship between internal and external efficacy, Yang Lin (2006) provides the framework for the two types of political contact -first, that between a candidate (and individuals working for the candidate in the campaign) and voters, and, second, interpersonal communication between voters. In his framework, candidate visits, coffees, door-to-door canvasses by staff, and email all qualify as communication with the candidate (and campaign). Conversations between individuals that assist in the interpretation of information they receive from the mass media consist of interpersonal communication. While there is limited research on the effectiveness of being asked, in a 1966 report by Bowman and Boynton, 26% of local political leaders responded that they had become active in their political party because they were asked to get involved. Of that, at least half had been asked by a neighbor, friend, or relative. This further gives legitimacy to elected leaders, and reduces post electoral conflicts.

In order to effectively comprehend a candidate or campaign “asking,” the researcher must go beyond actions and assess the words and rhetoric of a candidate. In an assessment of candidate speeches and messages, researchers tend to look at policy-making rhetoric (Howard and Hoffman 2007) that was used by candidates. These rhetorical strategies tend to address both the issues and “asking” to get involved. It is quite possible that there is a reciprocal relationship between support of a candidate’s platform and asking to participate. There seems to be little, if any, research on the direct ask of a candidate to

an individual to participate. Trent and Friedenberg (1995) analyze political campaign communication between national candidates and voters and state that interpersonal contact allows for a relationship and allows the candidate to be seen as accessible and available. Prior research on the role that a sitting president utilizes in office has documented that the president clearly has the capacity to mobilize large numbers of people directly based on the size and scope of his office (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). This view differs in Kogi state because, the sitting governor was defeated by the opposition candidate, in the first round, although, the elections were declared inconclusive by the INEC. We suspected that the introduction of card readers and E-Collation made the difference, otherwise, sitting presidents and governors hardly losses elections in Nigeria and elsewhere in the third world.

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) state that candidates, through the use of new technologies such as television and political ad campaigns, are more apt to speak directly to the electorate. Prior research supports the idea that political advertising exposes voters to relevant information which influences voters’ evaluations of the candidate (Kaid, 2007). Presidential campaigns have the ability to call attention to the high stakes and magnitude of the election. As pointed out by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), presidential elections captivate the media and offer individuals the opportunity to be a player in the national government. Presidential candidates are more apt to mobilize the public not for its own sake, but for the purpose of winning elections and influencing policies. Regardless of motive, the candidates and campaigns are asking people to vote. These voters are more likely to be inspired by a campaign or candidate as greater resources are spent and individual contact with voters increase. By far the most effective means of mobilizing voters is face to face contact (Green and Gerber, 2000). In addition, through the use of technologies such as television, internet, email, and cell

phones, campaigns and candidates are more able to directly connect with the voter. There was exception in the Kogi election, politicians rarely sponsored their campaign programme on radio, television or newspapers, rather, it was the over-zealot activists that bombarded people on the social media with unprofessional campaigns.

To portray a complete picture of political participation, it is equally as important to study the significance of being asked as to understand the political opportunity structures that individuals have available to them in the political process. Hansen (1985) argues that people get involved when there are opportunities or avenues available to them. If campaigns provide those avenues, more people will get involved. In additional supporting information, both Verba and Nie (1972) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) acknowledge the significant role that activity in voluntary organizations plays in laying the groundwork for providing a trained individual, with a set of leadership skills, to the political realm. Since the decline in vote and the call to action to identify ways to improve voting across Kogi state, we have identified the effectiveness of certain types of voter mobilization techniques and strategies used by campaigns and third party groups. This work highlights research on peer-to-peer contact, telephone calls, door-to-door canvasses, internet and email use, text messaging, and hands-on voter training as well as issues of timing and messaging, rather than relying on primordial sentiments such as ethnicity and religion. We equally understand the imperative of political behaviour, political culture socialization, as means of encouraging participation and representation in the political process. This we hoped, would promote the desired post election peace building, good governance, development and reduce conflicts

### **The Challenges Limiting Voters Mobilization Strategies in Kogi state**

Governance: The discussion about poor leadership is not as simple as the

concept itself. To be more specifically constructive, it must be noted that the concept is not outside the notion of governance and it includes, though not limited to the following attributes: Voice accountability, Political stability and absence of political violence, assassination and terrorism, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality control, The Rule of law, and Control of and reduction in corruption. 'Good governance' has become a mantra for politicians, bureaucrats, and employees of NGO (Mclean and McMillan, 2009). Kogi state lack good governance, and further disconnected the electorate from democratic values, thereby limiting voters' mobilization, campaign and recruitment. Once a voter knows that their votes count, they will be encouraged to participate in the electoral processes.

Development is many sided process, at the level of the individual and at the level of the social groups. At the level of the individual, it implies increased skills and capacity, creativity, greater freedom, responsibility, self-discipline and material well-being. At the level of the social groups, it implies ability to harness the various potential that would lead to reducing external and internal aggression; the maintenance and promotion of peaceful co-existence, without necessarily relying on ethnicity or religion (see Rodney, 1972). It is imperative to mention here too that both Dudley Seers and Samin Amin conception of development is fundamentally useful. According to Dudley, development should be considered if there is a conscious and deliberate efforts and progress in building and promoting capacity with minimal mistakes, but a repeated ones, as for Samin, the real concern about development should resolves around the following questions: What has been happening to the issues of poverty, unemployment and inequality, if two out of the three aforementioned have improved, we can then talk of development. The position of this paper is that, without development, it will be difficult to recruit voters for effective electoral processes.

Politics has a Plethora of definitions, and many scholars have different views. Harold Lasswell defines politics as who gets what, when, and how. David Easton is of the opinion that the authoritative allocation of values in the society should be real definition of politics. Peter Merki defines politics as the quest for power, order and justice, Quincy Wright sees politics as the art of influencing, manipulating, and controlling others with great ideas. Austin Ranny is of the opinion that politics is the process of resolution of conflict in society. Vermon Dyke sees politics as the struggle among actors pursuing conflicting desires on public issues. Earnest Baker said that politics is the activity (such as negotiation, argument, discussion, application of intellectual ideas, and persuasion) by which an issue is agitated or settled. How was politics misunderstood in Nigeria by every sector? Most political participants deliberately failed to see politics as a game, to be engaged with conscious and utmost intelligent. When we employ raffles, cutlass, gun, arrows and acid to resolve political challenges, we have left the temple of ‘politics’ which establishes that ‘ideas’ rules the world, and that the actor or actors with superior ideas wins every political debates, arguments, or issues as the case might arise. We resolve to violent act simply due to lack of or limited understanding of politics which is concerned with the systematic and scientific study and analysis of issues. Proper understanding of politics removes primordial sentiments.

**Political Culture and Socialization:** Culture is the totality of the way and life of the people (their foods, art, dress, beliefs, tradition and custom). Political therefore refers to the commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules (Macridis, 2013). However, according to Samuel Beer, political culture is one the four variables crucial to the analysis of political systems. To him, the components of political culture are values, beliefs, emotional attitudes about government ought to be conducted, and finally, about what political actors do. For

Robert Dahl, political culture is the salient elements of the culture, and these elements are:

- Orientations of problem-solving: are they pragmatic or rationalistic?
- Orientations to collective action: are they cooperative or non-cooperative?
- Orientations to the political system: are they allegiant or alienated?
- Orientations to other people: are they truthful or mistrustful?

The question at this stage is, what is the level our political culture, low, minimal, developed or mature? Put differently, what is the percentage of people with parochial political culture, subject political culture or participant political culture? Political socialization therefore is the process of transmitting societal values, orientations, ideology, tradition and customs into the naïve individuals so that he/she would not resort to violent during an election. Here, it is important to highlight and mention the agents of socialization, which include though not listed in their order of importance: the family, school, peer-group, media, and the religious bodies. The first two are the main drivers of socialization process. Proper vote’s mobilization, campaign strategies cannot survive without political socialization.

**Lack of Vibrant Party Ideology and Manifesto:** Party ideology is embedded in the party manifesto as an article of faith. Programmes to be executed and how to source for funds if elected are implicitly documented. Unfortunately, we have seen that most political parties in Nigeria since 1999 till date lack ideology and hence, their manifesto if any at all, is bereft of modern ideas that could translate into development and governance. Political parties without clear-cut ideology or manifesto, would resort to violent before, during and after every election, they have nothing to offer, or brought to the table. The electorate is left with no alternative. Beyond is the issue of lack of internal democracy within political parties. Drawing heavily from the above scenario, the electorate is placed in a

precarious situation and made as a option rather than a choice. Since you cannot give what you do not have, the consequences are crisis, conflict, political violence or political assassinations. Post election peace building is achievable with vibrant ideology and manifesto, because it encourages discerning and ideologically based issues which affects the people directly. Voters can ask questions and demand answers from contestants, thereby making electioneering campaign vibrant and sophisticated.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Structural functionalism has been found particularly useful in the comparison of political systems. Taking Easton's systems analysis as a starting point, Almond looks for the functions which could be included among the input and output functions of all political systems. On the input side are the functions of (1) interest articulation and (2) interest aggregation. Second, on the output side are the functions of (3) rule making, (4) rule-application and (5) rule adjudication. The functions of (6) political communication is undertaken to inform all within the political system and outside of these diverse activities. Additionally, every system performs (7) systems maintenance and adaptation functions through political socialization and recruitment of people. According to Almond, the functioning of any political system may also be viewed in terms of its capabilities defined as 'the way it performs as a unit in its environment.' The concepts of regulative, extractive, distributive, and responsive capability are employed as criteria to assess how a system is performing within its environment, how it is shaping its environment, and how it is being shaped by it (Almond, 1964).

Almond's formulations have been faulted on three grounds by this study. First, it has been noted that it is not easy to distinguish between the 'deliberate aims of the participants and what takes place because the system seemed to achieve certain aims.' Second, the identification of functions is alleged to rest on the

interpretation the analyst places on observed developments thus there cannot be complete objectivity. In effect, the number of the identified functions can be more or less than the seven listed by Almond. Third, the approach has been seen as culture-bound since the functions attributed to the political system are too closely modeled on Western political systems. However, Almond's structural function approach has been recognized as the major existing tool for genuine comparative analysis of political systems and has been described as a 'fairly realistic interpretation of the political life.'

### **The Nature of African State as a Consequence on Poor Voting Behaviour**

The African socio-economic formation is different from that of the advanced industrial capitalist societies of Europe and America. The African socio-economic formation is characterized by uneven and combined development of the different modes of production. There is the capitalist sector which exists in combination with the pre-capitalist sector at various stages of disintegration. While the capitalist enclaves (urban areas) are engaged in the production of exchange values, the pre-capitalist formations are engaged in the production of subsistence. The relation among producers is mechanist, while specialization in production is rudimentary. Consequently exchange production and exchanged relations is limited and markets not fully develop (Ake, 1981). The State in Africa like in every other society is the organized instrument of the ruling class. However, the specific characteristic of the state in Africa is the result of the specific historical condition of its emergence and development. That historical condition is colonialism.

Colonialism shaped the nature of the state and society in Africa as well as the dynamics of the ruling class. The historical specificity of the colonial state in Africa ruled out certain similarities between it and the state in the advanced capitalist societies of Europe. In the advance capitalist societies

of Europe, the state was the classic state in the sense that it was the instrument of the capitalist class which emerged with it from the feudal mode of production, to maintain its domination over the other classes in the capitalist society. On the other hand the task of the colonial state was two-folds and different. The task of the colonial state was to:

- Conquer and subdue the people of the African colonies in such a way as to make it easy and cheap to exploit their material and human resources.
- Establish capitalist relations of production in the African colonies in such a way as to guarantee surplus value to the capitalist in Europe (Elejo, 2012).

While the state in Europe maintained domination over the non-capitalist classes of Europe, the state in Africa exercised domination over the African people as a whole. And while the European state regulated the operation of the capitalist mode of production in favour of the bourgeois class, the state in Africa had first to create the capitalist mode of production, make it dominant in the society and make it yield profits for European, changed the character of the state directly, actively and more extensively in the economic, social, cultural and political life of the people than was the case in Europe. Furthermore, civil society associated with the institutions of state power and which support and reinforce these institutions had either not emerged or well developed. Thus civil society in Africa is not attentive and assertive. In Europe, civil society and the capitalist mode of production emerged before the capitalist state (Ake, 1996).

Consequently, the state in Africa lacks autonomy because its power base is not in society. Thus the state is not in a position to mediate class struggle, since it is itself involved in the struggle on the side of the dominant faction of the ruling class. In such a situation the realization of the law of value is hampered and the development of productive forces is slowed and primitive accumulation of resources reins with

massive intervention of force in the labour process. At the political level, the struggle for the control of state power becomes warfare. Power is overvalued and security lies only in getting more power. Might is co-extensive with right. The implication of all this for sustainable development is obvious.

The weakness of civil society which has resulted in the non-autonomisation of the state limits the chances of mediating contradictions between members and fractions of the capitalist class. Consequently, the contradiction within this factitious class has made intra-class political competition very grim and placed high premium on political power, to the detriment of governmental and political stability. The tone of class struggle is at by the limited development of civil society and consequently the limited autonomisation of the system and mechanism of domination (Ake, 1981, Nnoli, 2003).

The weakness of civil society and the resultant non-autonomisation of the state have accentuated the usual contradictions, rendering them particularly difficult to mediate. This is particularly true with the persistence of primary loyalties and ethnic solidarity has made the coherence within the dominant class more difficult. Furthermore, the weak nature of civil society makes for the nominal existence of law; the law does not pertain to all. It openly expresses the interest of any faction of the dominant class in government. In this circumstance, competition, whether economic or political is often norm-less. In so far as contradictions, or conflicts cannot be mediated and differences are made absolute, there is high premium on political power as the means of welfare and security, so that political competition becomes exceptionally intense and tangentially norm-less.

In Nigeria, the weak nature of civil society means that the ruling class cannot establish its hegemony on the society. The consequence of this is decisively obvious; dominance of the fractious ruling class can mainly be maintained through force. This means that the coercive apparatuses of the

state, namely the Army and the Police becomes pervasive in society, this becomes more so because of the high premium placed on politics and unrestrained nature of political competition. Within the African state, the resources of physical coercion become a tool of a particular group, especially the dominant fraction of the ruling class. Since political competition is grim and norm-less. This is a situation of raw power, as security and rights depends on the control of political or economic power. The struggle for power is everything and pursued by every means. The implication of politics turning into a battle is the militarization of society by the fraction of the ruling class in government.

### **The Role of Civil Society as Providing ideological Solutions**

To fully grasp the nature of electoral and political violence in Africa, it is first important that we understood the nature of class forces that constitute the state. Capitalism in post colonial Africa is largely an enclave capitalism restricted mainly to the urban areas, within these conscious though fragmented. The fragmentation of the indigenous capitalist class reflects the weak nature of the civil society. It is this weakness of civil society with among other things allow for the introduction of primary loyalties and ethnic particularize into political competition. This is often re-played in every election since the first republic. The weakness of civil society which has resulted in the non-autonomisation of the state limits the "chances" of mediating contradictions between members and fractions of the capitalist class. Consequently, the contradiction within this factitious class has made intra-class political competition very grim and placed high premium on political power, to the detriment of government of civil society and consequently the limited autonomisation of the system and mechanism of domination (Ake, 1981, and Nnoli, 2003).

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This is a situation of raw power, as security and right depends on the control of power. The struggle for power is everything and pursued by every means. The implication of the politics turning into a battle is the militarization of society by the fraction of the ruling class in government. Militarization is a process in which high value is placed on war and accords primacy in state and society to the armed forces. It exalts the function, the application of violence, and an institutional structure, and

Police and Military establishment. It implies both a policy orientation and a power relationship.

Because of the Lucrative nature of state power both for state power both for welfare and security purpose the struggle for it, it so grim that those who control instrument of warfare are always in the force when moments of intercourse are confliction. Thus the consummation of the politics of warfare is the military itself. Hence in socio-economic formations with weak civil society everything revolves around.

For precision in the analysis of political instability, especially military intervention a firm grasps of the concept of civil society is essential. Hegel was the first major philosopher to assume a contrast of private with public or constitutional, this corresponded to the contrast of the state with civil society. A state according to Hegel comes into being when there arises a genuine public authority, recognized as higher than the civil society which embodies private interest. The state as Hegel conceived it is no utilitarian institution engaged in commonplace (i.e. every day) business for providing public service, administration law, performing police duties, and adjusting industrial and economic interests. All these functions in Hegel scheme belongs to civil society. The state may indeed direct and regulate them as need arises, but it does not itself perform them. Civil society depends upon the state for intelligent supervision and moral significance. Hegel's account of civil society was in fact a careful, even an elaborate, analysis of guilds and corporations, the estate and classes, the association and local communities that made up structure of the German society with which he was familiar.

However, a much less philosophical account of civil society was presented by one of the greatest scholars on the subject, Antonio Gramsci's, in his Prison Notebook which was published after World War II and the collapse of Italian fascism. In the book Gramsci explains why on the hand

bourgeois rule in the advanced industrial countries assume a more consensual character and has earned legitimacy from the ruled with naked force becoming less and less a feature of the rule, on the other hand bourgeois rule in the underdeveloped countries is marked by constant deployment of force in its naked form. To Gramsci, the explanation for these to different form of class rule is rooted in the concept of hegemony (Gramsci, 1957).

The core of the concept of hegemony is cultural and ideological Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to mean the method by which the ruling class obtained consent of the governed to their domination. The role of winning the consent of the governed is performed by the intellectuals – who diffuse the world view of the dominant class to all aspect of society so that it become a “common sense notion” of society, not questionable. The intellectual articulate the collective consciousness of their class in the political, social and economic sphere and each social and economic sphere and each social class creates its own intellectuals. Thus every social class has its own intellectuals who give it homogeneity and awareness of its functions in the economic and political fields. The intellectuals of the dominant class disseminate the world view of its class to the extent that it becomes an unquestionable common sense notion. They preserve the hegemony of their class over society by means of justifying ideology of which they are the carrier. The intellectual's gives legitimacy to existing hegemonic structures rendering it acceptable to allied and subordinate groups, universalizing its dominance. Gramsci therefore considered that the ruling class does not resort to force to maintain its rule over society, rather it maintain its rule by massively and predominantly imposing its will on society through the exercise of its intellectual and moral leadership.

Gramsci situates hegemony in the sphere of civil society. He uses the concept of civil society to refer to the intermediary sphere between, and includes aspect of

substructure and superstructure civil society then stands between the economic structure and the state and it the “ensemble of organisms commonly called private”. The informal etc., they constitute the domain In which the bourgeoisie propagate their world view to exercise the function of social control. the private associations diffuse the world view of the ruling class into common sense notion, consequently the function of social control takes place not at the political but at the ideological: “civil society had above all a cultural function and through the hegemony of the ruling class thus presented the ethical content of the state. “the ability of the ruling class to maintain its power without resort to force thus laid in the concept of hegemony (Gramsci, 1957).

Having located hegemony or social control in the sphere of civil society, Gramsci locates domination having to do with depression at the state. The state then, is separate from civil society because is functions mainly by repression and it is manifested in institutions of force like the Police, Military, Prison, Courts etc. in the advance industrial countries which are also the “Key stone of bourgeois edifice”, civil society is fully developed, assuming a complex structure. The principle of the impartiality of the executive who vacate office when tenure is over and of division of powers also ensure the consent of the governed and further gives civil society a more complex structure. The real nature of power is masked behind a façade of juridical notions of the rule of law. The complexity or denseness of civil society makes it resistant to crisis and depressions and any form of consciousness is refracted by civil society. The greatest of economic crisis is rebounded by civil society without any repercussion on the political, in effect; civil society acts as a buffer to the state.

In contradistinction to the advanced industrial countries, civil society is embryonic in the less developed countries: relations with the state are direct not refracted by a developed civil society. The most minimal of economic crises has

immediate repercussions in the political field because of the absence of a developed civil society. Immediate contact is marked by violence. Fear is an imaginative thought, but we know we can make it, achieve sustainable rural development.

### **The Conclusion**

The conclusion is that the desired need for a vibrant and sophisticated voter’s mobilization and campaign strategies in Kogi state is not only theoretically fundamental but empirically imperative considering the sharp division among the major ethnic groups after the last governorship election. There is a great need to build and promote post election peace so that Kogi state can witness good governance and development. for avoidance of critical doubts, the governorship election raised so many political, social and constitutional challenges, especially with regards to the issues of inconclusive re-run, inheritance of votes, rejection of the post of deputy governor, supremacy of party constitution and INEC electoral Laws, impeachment of speaker, and finally, mutual suspicions. It must be stated that Kogi state need deserves the best in the areas of providing infrastructures such as roads, water, health care services, school, market, sanitation and protection of lives and properties. No doubt, good governance is the solution.

The question is, can there be good governance and democratic leadership with credible, free and fair election? Can we have free and fair election without voter’s mobilization and campaign strategies? Certainly, not because, there is therefore a synergy between good governance, post election peace building, voters mobilization and campaign strategies. Political scientists are story tellers, but we tell our story scientifically, because, we are concerned with the systematic study and analysis of politics. We attempt to understand the political behaviour of individual, social groups and societies. We focus on the factors and conditions that affect political actors, political events and political institutions. As fragrance of social sciences,

we pride ourselves distinctively by discovering the principles that should be adhered to in public affairs by deliberately and consciously studying the operations of governance in order to demonstrate what is perfect and criticize what is abnormal. However, the most interesting aspect is suggesting the way forward.

### Recommendations

We have, after careful analysis of the challenges of voters mobilization and campaign strategies in Kogi state, come to the conclusion that, political behaviour, political culture and political socialization are the crux of the challenges to building post election peace, governance and development. Why is the concept of political behaviour important as our recommendation? Political behaviour identifies the behaviour of individual or groups as primary unit of analysis, this is because, it seeks to examine the behaviour, actions and acts of individual, rather than characteristics of individual such as the Election Tribunal, INEC, the Police and others as they relates to the conduct of election process. We therefore recommend following:

- Electioneering campaign should be issues based
- Voters recruitment should be handled professionally
- Civil society should be partisan
- Good governance and development should be promoted and sustained
- Political behaviour and socialization should be vibrant
- Political parties should be driven by ideology

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